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We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have … is applied to finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that honest communication and play of the Pareto …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281162
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have … is applied to finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that honest communication and play of the Pareto …-enforcing. -- efficiency ; communication ; coordination ; honesty ; evolutionary stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393210
of two-sided pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by way of introducing a meaning … games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it … equilibrium that is not self-enforcing. We also extend the approach to one-sided communication. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094072
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334653
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335167
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596312
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645366
No abstract.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685046
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025199
We model a player's uncertainty about other player's strategy choices as probability distributions over their strategy sets. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in each of which every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950018