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Evolutionary models of preference formation

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Annual review of economics 11 (2019), pp. 329-354

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012623470

Evolutionary models of preference formation

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013492968

Homo moralis : preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 81 (2013) 6, pp. 2269-2302

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237410

Evolution and Kantian morality

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Games and economic behavior 98 (2016), pp. 56-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771366

Efficiency, communication and honesty

Demichelis, Stefano; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2006

We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281162

Homo Moralis: Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2012

What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by their success in terms of resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a convex combinations of selfishness and morality stand out as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928930

Evolution and Kantian morality : a correction and addendum

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2023 - Revised January 13, 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013543098

Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution

Demichelis, Stefano; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2007

Language is arguably a powerful coordination device in real-life interactions. We here develop a game-theoretic model of two-sided pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and postulating two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094072

Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012266416

Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-21

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some … material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or … worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771133