Showing 1 - 10 of 58
Sets closed under rational behavior were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) as subsets of the strategy space that contain all best replies to all strategy profiles in the set. We here consider a more restrictive notion of closure under rational behavior: a subset of the strategy space is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281178
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025199
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596312
No abstract.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685046
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281162
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334653
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335167
Language is arguably a powerful coordination device in real-life interactions. We here develop a game-theoretic model of two-sided pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and postulating two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094072
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645366
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393210