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Language, meaning, and games : a model of communication, coordination, and evolution : comment
Heller, Yuval - In: The American economic review 104 (2014) 6, pp. 1857-1863
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405655
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Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems
Vieille, Nicolas; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2002
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334653
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Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems
Vieille, Nicolas; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2002
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645366
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Testing Game Theory
Weibull, Jörgen W. - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2000
Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects playing games in the laboratory violate such solution concepts as Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection. This claim is premature. What has been rejected are certain joint hypotheses about preferences, knowledge, and behavior. This note...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649156
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Investment, rational inattention, and delegation
Lindbeck, Assar; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2017
We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657490
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Language, meaning, and games : a model of communication, coordination, and evolution
DeMichelis, Stefano; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: The American economic review 98 (2008) 4, pp. 1292-1311
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003770130
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Efficiency, communication and honesty
DeMichelis, Stefano (contributor);  … - 2006 - First draft February 1, 2006, This version: November 28, 2006
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have … is applied to finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that honest communication and play of the Pareto …-enforcing. -- efficiency ; communication ; coordination ; honesty ; evolutionary stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393210
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Marknader med asymmetrisk information
Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf; Persson, Torsten; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Ekonomisk debatt 29 (2001) 8, pp. 527-534
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001628926
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Markets with asymmetric information : the contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz
Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf; Persson, Torsten; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 104 (2002) 2, pp. 195-211
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001686563
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A scent of lemon-seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 163-186
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752430