We develop a general method to study the effects of non-linear taxation in dynamic settings using variational arguments. We first derive general theoretical formulas that characterize the welfare effects of local tax reforms and, in particular, the optimal tax system, potentially restricted...

This paper derives novel formulas for the welfare gains of any tax reform around initial (optimal or suboptimal) dynamic tax systems. We use a perturbation-based method to express these formulas in terms of easily interpretable and empirically estimable parameters: elasticities of income and...

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems — the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

We develop a general method to study the effects of non-linear taxation in dynamic settings using variational arguments. We first derive general theoretical formulas that characterize the welfare effects of local tax reforms and, in particular, the optimal tax system, potentially restricted...

We develop a general method to study the effects of non-linear taxation in dynamic settings using variational arguments. We first derive general theoretical formulas that characterize the welfare effects of local tax reforms and, in particular, the optimal tax system, potentially restricted...

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems -- the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

We study the incidence and the optimal design of nonlinear income taxes in a Mirrleesian economy with a continuum of endogenous wages. We characterize analytically the incidence of any tax reform by showing that one can mathematically formalize this problem as an integral equation. For a CES...

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with...