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We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260718
We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers´ incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers´ ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260879
We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a high-demand and a low-demand market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271113
We analyze the efficiency defense in merger control. First, we show that the relationship between exogenous efficiency gains and social welfare can be non-monotone. Second, we consider both endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiencies and find that merger proposals are largely aligned with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309799
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture...
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We analyze the welfare effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly if the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. We derive conditions such that otherwise price-increasing mergers become externality-free by the use of remedial divestitures. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533038
We examine the competitive effects of a passive partial ownership (PPO) when it serves as an instrument for the acquirer firm to learn the merger synergies with the target firm in advance. The realization of a synergy is uncertain ex ante, so that a direct merger exhibits a downside risk not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684773