This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of...

This Paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyse the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyse the implication of market structure for the distribution of...

This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of...

Das DIW Berlin veranstaltete am 26. Oktober dieses Jahres den 2. Wissenschaftlichen Roundtable "Informationsgesellschaft und Wettbewerb", der die Praxistauglichkeit des "More Economic Approach" in der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik zum Gegenstand hatte. Mit dem "More Economic Approach" gewinnt...

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem under an inquisitorial and an adversarial competition policy system. Agents' incentives to produce evidence depend critically on the action set of the decision maker. In an inquisitorial system, allowing ex ante for a...