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The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly
Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - Abteilung "Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller … - 2001
application is to comparetakeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model withlinear demand and costs … Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, asproducts become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes more … likely under Bertrand andless likely under Cournot competition. <br> <br> <i>ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Übernahmeanreize im Oligopol …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772946
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The incentives for takeover in oligopoly
Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - 2001
application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand and … under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes … more likely under Bertrand and less likely under Cournot competition. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278090
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The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly
Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand and … under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes … more likely under Bertrand and less likely under Cournot competition. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136493
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On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects
Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - 2010
We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303797
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Bertrand competition in markets with network effects and switching costs
Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - 2011
We analyze Bertrand duopoly competition in markets with network effects and consumer switching costs. Depending on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305915
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EU-Verfahren gegen die Novelle des Telekommunikationsgesetzes gefährdet Liberalisierung
Baake, Pio; Haucap, Justus; Wey, Christian - In: DIW Wochenbericht 74 (2007) 12, pp. 185-188
Am 26. Februar 2007 hat die EU-Kommission ein beschleunigtes Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Deutschland wegen der Einführung von angeblichen "Regulierungsferien" in dem jüngst novellierten Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) eröffnet. Die Kommission vermutet, dass die dort getroffene...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601717
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Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives
Haucap, Justus; Wey, Christian - 2003
This paper examines how different unionisation structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation: (1) 'Decentralisation' where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263388
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On the (mis-) alignment of consumer and social welfare in markets with network effects
Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - 2008
We analyze duopoly Bertrand competition under network effects. We consider both incompatible and compatible products …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265012
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Bertrand competition in markets with network effects and switching costs
Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - 2008
We analyze market dynamics under Bertrand duopoly competition in industries with network effects and consumer switching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265013
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Mergers in imperfectly segmented markets
Baake, Pio; Wey, Christian - 2009
We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a high-demand and a low-demand market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271113