agreement and then decide on emissions by a strategic delegation stage. In the weak delegation game, principals first decide … emissions. In countries not joining the IEA, agents choose emissions to maximize their own payoff, while agents of countries … joining the IEA set emissions to internalize some exogenously given fraction of the externalities that own emissions cause on …

agreement and then decide on emissions by a strategic delegation stage. In the weak delegation game, principals first decide … emissions. In countries not joining the IEA, agents choose emissions to maximize their own payoff, while agents of countries … joining the IEA set emissions to internalize some exogenously given fraction of the externalities that own emissions cause on …

in South is that this results in decreasing equilibrium emissions of South. I find that this can only happen if the …

in South is that this results in decreasing equilibrium emissions of South. I find that this can only happen if the …