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Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the …
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If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
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The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …
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This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming firms observe imperfect signals of the cost reduction induced by the innovation. The innovator adopts a direct revelation mechanism and awards an unrestricted license to the firm that reports the...
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competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956370
game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956380