Mobilizing climate finance for developing countries is crucial for achieving a fair and effective global climate regime. To date developed countries retain wide discretion over their national contributions. We explore how different degrees of international coordination may influence the fairness...

Developed countries have pledged to mobilise $100 billion per year by 2020 for climate change action in developing countries. Progress on financing is necessary to ensure broader progress on climate change cooperation. Supporting the global commitment is in Australia's interests, since climate...

Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty. Implementing the schemes, however, has pitfalls. This research report argues that requiring firms to pay an extra fee or tax is the...

This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice...

Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty, but implementation has pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing a price floor is by way of firms paying an extra fee...

This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice...

This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous...

This paper examines the linking of price-based and quantity-based provision of a public good by two parties in the example of pollution control under a global quantity constraint, using a stochastic partial-equilibrium model. One country chooses a price-based instrument (tax) and trades with...

International funding for climate change action in developing countries may enhance the legitimacy of global climate governance. However, by allowing for a fragmented approach to mobilizing funds, current multilateral commitments raise further legitimacy challenges. We analyze the potential for...

This paper examines the effects of combining an international cap-and-trade scheme with national carbon taxes. We consider a two-country stochastic partial equilibrium model with log-normally distributed uncertainty. The situation is analogous to the situation where European countries impose...