We develop a model with which to explore discrimination and prejudice within labor markets. Our approach emphasizes the role of an individual's own experience in the assessment of efforts of other individuals. Specifically, we consider a two stage process in which individuals first learn,...

We argue that a social norm and the coordination of behavior within social groups can be expressed by a correlated equilibrium. Given a social group structure (a partition of individuals into social groups), we propose four conditions that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent...

Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large - must be,...

Motivated by issues of imitation, learning and evolution, we introduce a framework of non-cooperative games, allowing both countable sets of pure actions and player types and player types and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can...

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behaviour. We propose that this consistency requires the existence...

In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete...