The majority of bank liabilities are deposits typically not withdrawn for extended periods. We propose a dynamic model of banks in which depositors forecast banks' leverage and default decisions, and withdraw optimally by trading off current against future liquidity needs. Endogenous deposit...

Bank liabilities include debt with long-term maturities and deposits that typically are not withdrawn for extended periods. This subjects bank liabilities to debt dilution. Our analysis shows that this has major effects for how monetary policy shocks are transmitted to banks and for optimal...

We determine optimal token issuance and fee rates for issuers with varying degrees of commitment. For the polar cases of no commitment (Markov perfect) and full commitment (Ramsey) we study the conditions under which equilibriums exist. Assuming convex maintenance costs guarantees well-defined...

We study capital regulation in a dynamic banking model with non-maturing deposits. Optimal withdrawals of depositors make bank deposits endogenously long-term. Capital regulation addresses deposit dilution but is subject to a time-inconsistency problem. Comparing the optimal policies of...