In this paper we analyse the equilibrium structure for a particular type of electricity market. We consider a market with two generators offering electricity into a pool. Generators are centrally dispatched, with cheapest offers used first. The pool price is determined as the highest-priced...

This paper investigates the optimal bidding strategy (supply function) for a generator offering power into a wholesale electricity market. The model has three characteristics: the uncertainties facing the generator are described by a single probability function, namely the market distribution...

In electricity wholesale markets, generators often sign long term contracts with purchasers of power in order to hedge risks. In this paper, we consider a market where demand is uncertain, but can be represented as a function of price together with a random shock. Each generator offers a smooth...

In this paper, we consider the optimal policy for a generator offering power into a wholesale electricity market operating under a pool arrangement. Anderson and Philpott [Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), pp. 82--100] recently discussed necessary conditions for an optimal offer curve when there is...

This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’...