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Sequential legislative lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - Institut for Virksomhedsledelse og Økonomi, Syddansk … - 2009
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies, Lobby 0 and Lobby 1, compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225867
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Sequential legislative lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003904212
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Sequential legislative lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579372
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Sequential legislative lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009665276
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Sequential legislative lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - In: Social choice and welfare 39 (2012) 2/3, pp. 491-520
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009624380
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Sequential legislative lobbying
Breton, Michel Le; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - In: Social Choice and Welfare 39 (2012) 2, pp. 491-520
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010998898
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Sequential Legislative Lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2012
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004761
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Sequential Legislative Lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2012
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268412
Cover Image
Sequential legislative lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - In: Social choice and welfare 39 (2012) 2, pp. 491-521
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009989570
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Sequential Legislative Lobbying
Le Breton, Michel; Sudhölter, Peter; Zaporozhets, Vera - Laboratoire d'Économie des Ressources Naturelles … - 2012
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154532