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Network games with incomplete information
Martí, Joan de; Zenou, Yves - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010465564
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Coordination on networks
Leister, Matthew; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787923
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Who's who in crime networks : wanted - the key player
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002123916
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Who's who in crime network : wanted the key player
Ballester, Coralio (contributor);  … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002007765
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Delinquent networks
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831247
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Delinquent networks
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010) 1, pp. 34-61
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008649315
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Who's who in networks : wanted: the key player
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 74 (2006) 5, pp. 1403-1417
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003380407
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Who's who in networks : wanted: the key player
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003226129
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Delinquent networks
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848306
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Delinquent Networks
Ballester, Coralio - 2009
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763925