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Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831247

Delinquent Networks

Ballester, Coralio - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763925

Coordination on Networks

Leister, C. Matthew - 2019

We study a coordination game among agents on a network, who choose whether or not to take an action in an uncertain environment that yields value increasing in the actions of neighbors. We develop an algorithm that fully characterizes the equilibrium partitions (coordination sets) and thresholds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900481

Network Games Made Simple

Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie - 2022

; clearly, this is a restrictive assumption. We developed a theory called sign-equivalent transformation (SET) underlying the … mathematical structure behind a system of equations defining the Nash equilibrium. By applying our theory, we reveal that many … best-response potentials after appropriate restructuring of equilibrium conditions using SET. Thus, through our theory, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076777

Delinquent networks

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269030

Who's Who in Crime Network. Wanted the Key Player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2004

Criminals are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among criminals are modeled by means of a graph where criminals compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbours. Each criminal decides in a non-cooperative way how much crime effort he will exert. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320179