This paper studies a class of information aggregation models which we call “aggregation games.†It departs from the related literature in two main respects: information is aggregated by averaging rather than majority rule, and each player selects from a continuum of reports rather than...

This paper studies the incentives facing Potentially Responsible Parties at a hazardous waste site to promote excessive investigation of the site and thus postpone the beginning of the remediation phase of the cleanup. We model the problem as an incomplete information, simultaneous-move game...

The burden of resolving an environmental problem is typically shared among several responsible parties. To clarify the nature and extent of the problem, these parties must provide information to the regulator. Based on this information, the regulator will instigate an investigation of the...

Superfund cleanup has been extremely slow. Traditional analysis has centered around reducing negotiation and litigation to expedite the cleanup process. We investigate other factors which provide possible incentives for delay, namely, discounting, risk aversion, and compensation for off-site...