Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...

This brief note describes the step-by-step protocol for conducting online economics experiments at the UCSC LEEPS Laboratory. This protocol assumes that the subject pool is managed using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment backend and interfaces are developed and deployed using oTree (Chen,...

Can an efficient correlated equilibrium emerge without any exogenous benevolent agent providing coordinating signals? Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which we test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, we observe time average play that is...

Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...

Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical rel evance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...