Showing 1 - 10 of 16
A social planner wishes to launch a project but the contenders capable of runningthe project are cash-constrained and may default. To signal their capabilities, thecontenders may finance their bids through debt or equity, depending on the mechanismchosen by the social planner. When moral hazard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360727
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction interbidderresale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, withpositive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition anddivides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360823
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale complicate the winner's curse and upset previous fixed-point methods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390727
A long-standing unsolved problem, often arising from auctions with multidimensional bids, is how to design seller-optimal auctions when bidders' private characteristics ("types") differ in many dimensions. This paper solves the problem, assuming bidder-types stochastically independent across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236094
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale complicate the winner’s curse and upset previous fixed-point...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779935
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction interbidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005024293
A long-standing unsolved problem, often arising from auctions with multidimensional bids, is how to design seller-optimal auctions when bidders' private characteristics ("types") differ in many dimensions. This paper solves the problem, assuming bidder-types stochastically independent across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766617
We consider auction environments in which bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations and study the optimal selling mechanisms in such environments. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766913
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153580
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005296857