Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one’s rivals may be countered by therivals’ threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of productioneconomies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hinderedcompetitive behaviors as a coalition’s attempt to...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked dependson specific rules that allocate authority among shareholders, because a blocking coalition’sresources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. Based on anotion of stochastic blocking, we extend...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked dependson the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition’sresources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notionof blocking that takes such...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on specific rules that allocate authority among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. Based on a notion of stochastic blocking, we extend...

Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one's rivals may be countered by the rivals' threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of production economies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hindered competitive behaviors as a coalition's attempt to...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such...