This paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement (FTA) network formation game among N countries. We first explore the static model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable FTA networks. Then, we develop a dynamic model...

This paper considers one-way flow network formation games in which transmission through a series of agents is subject to decay. We analyze the myopic best-response dynamics of network formation games, occasionally perturbed by state-dependent random noises. Specifically, if an agent is isolated...

The paper examines whether bilateral free trade agreements can lead to global free trade. We reconsider the endogenous tariff model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (<CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) who study pairwise stability of free trade networks. We depart from their analysis by adopting the concept of pairwise...</citationref>