Corporate governance and firm disclosure are endogenously determined. We exploit locally exogenous variations in corporate governance created by "close-call" governance-related shareholder proposals, using a fuzzy RDD and the techniques developed in text analytics to examine whether better...

We use a natural experiment to weigh conflicting theories on the causal impact of shareholder litigation threat on the readability of corporate financial disclosures. In response to a 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that caused an unexpected reduction in litigation risk, we find that...

While there is widespread concern that target CEO retention by a private equity acquirer can result in a lower premium for target shareholders because of the potential conflict of interest of the CEO, it is also possible that target shareholders could benefit from CEO retention because it can...

CEOs have a potential conflict of interest when their company is acquired: they can bargain to be retained by the acquirer and for private benefits rather than for a higher premium to be paid to the shareholders. We investigate the determinants of target CEO retention by the acquirer and whether...

We find that the announcement gain to target shareholders from acquisitions is significantly lower if a private firm instead of a public firm makes the acquisition. Non-operating firms like private equity funds make the majority of private bidder acquisitions. On average, target shareholders...