Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...

Introduced in the European Union, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule is analyzed in a setting of information asymmetry and future private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and the outside investors. Both...

This paper looks at the combination of cash and share payment in takeovers, particularly in analyzing the condition of its optimal mix setting. This problem develops in a context of asymmetry of information for the buyer has lower information on the target firm than the sellers. But the bidder...

Debt is traditionally analyzed as disciplinary in the shareholders-manager conflict. It is less commonly analyzed in relation to controlling and outside shareholders. This paper shows that the joint problematics of ownership, private benefits and debt leverage are linked in a framework of...

In this paper, we develop a contingent claim analysis concerning both inside and outside shareholders' rights to sell their shares at the acquisition bid price. We will show that this regulation brings about wealth transfer towards inside shareholders (compared to a situation without any...

Stock options plans are used to increase managerial incentives. The main question is to determine whether there exists an optimal incentive contract, which means a contract satisfying both managers and shareholders. First, the cash-flow gain created by the managers' effort is supposed known by...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

Having been introduced in the European Union and in many other countries, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule should be analyzed in a context of appropriation of private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and...

In this paper, we develop a contingent claim analysis on shareholders' right to sell unconditionally their shares at the acquisition bid price during a takeover bid procedure. Compared with a situation without any guarantee, this regulation brings about wealth transfer towards outside...

This paper examines the combination of cash and share payments made during corporate acquisitions. Particularly, it analyzes the conditions of an optimal mixed payment in a context of asymmetry of information. Using a model, we highlight that the setting of conditions of payment is an endogenous...