Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

Having been introduced in the European Union and in many other countries, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule should be analyzed in a context of appropriation of private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and...

In this paper, we develop a contingent claim analysis on shareholders' right to sell unconditionally their shares at the acquisition bid price during a takeover bid procedure. Compared with a situation without any guarantee, this regulation brings about wealth transfer towards outside...

This paper examines the combination of cash and share payments made during corporate acquisitions. Particularly, it analyzes the conditions of an optimal mixed payment in a context of asymmetry of information. Using a model, we highlight that the setting of conditions of payment is an endogenous...

The equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. In order to better analyze the consequence of such a rule, we need to account for the information asymmetry that exists between new controlling shareholders and outside investors with private...

A publication score of voluntary disclosed information disclosed by French firms was built on the 2003-2007 period. This original set of data is used to analyze the impact of the introduction of IFRS standards scheduled in 2005. It is also used to identify the determinants of communication...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports...

Having been introduced in the European Union and in many other countries, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule should be analyzed in a context of appropriation of private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and...

Stock option plans are used to increase managerial incentives, and business practices usually set the exercise price equal to the stock market price. The purpose of this paper is to underline the importance of a process of negotiation leading to a possible equilibrium contract satisfying both...