We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers (dictators) in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty. We use a...

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities...

An overview is presented of some parametric and semi-parametric models, estimators, and specification tests that can be used to analyze ordered response variables. In particular, limited dependent variable models that generalize ordered probit are compared to regression models that generalize...

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities...

We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictators") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty. We use...

Abstract We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies the effects of distributional preferences and penalizing unfair proposer behavior ("perceived intentions") on responder decisions in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among...