We investigate how negatively reciprocal traits of unemployed individuals interact with "sticks" policies imposing constraints on individual job search effort in the context of the German welfare system. For this we merge survey data of long-term unemployed individuals, containing indicators of...

In their IZA Discussion Paper 10247, Johansson and Lee claim that the main result (Proposition 3) in Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) does not hold. We show that their claim is incorrect. At a certain point within their line of reasoning, they make a rather basic error while transforming one...

There has been much interest recently in the relationship between economic conditions and mortality, with some studies showing that mortality is pro-cyclical whereas others find the opposite. Some suggest that the aggregation level of analysis (e.g. individual vs. regional) matters. We use both...

We examine a new general class of hazard rate models for survival data, containing a parametric and a nonparametric component. Both can be a mix of a time effect and (possibly time-dependent) marker or covariate effects. A number of well-known models are special cases. In a counting process...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

We propose and implement a new method to estimate treatment effects in settings where individuals need to be in a certain state (e.g. unemployment) to be eligible for a treatment, treatments may commence at different points in time, and the outcome of interest is realized after the individual...

We investigate the effect of counseling and monitoring on the individual transition rate to employment. We theoretically analyze these policies in a job search model with two search channels and endogenous search effort. In the empirical analysis we use unique administrative and survey data...

This paper finds that unemployment insurance sanctions substantially raise individual transition rates from unemployment to employment. Sanctions are punitive benefits reductions that are supposed to make recipients comply with certain minimum requirements concerning search behavior. We provide...

This paper examines the empirical analysis of treatment effects on duration outcomes from data that contain instrumental variation. We focus on social experiments in which an intention to treat is randomized and compliance may be imperfect. We distinguish between cases where the treatment starts...