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van den Brink, Rene; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2011

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value … all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of … N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691

Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities

van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2010

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973

Interval Solutions for TU-Games

van den Brink, Rene - 2017

Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012946145

Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation

van den Brink, Rene; Dietz, Chris - 2012

It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of (weighted) digraph games. To be specific, they are digraph games in which the digraph is the transitive closure of a rooted tree. In this paper we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326477

An Owen-Type Value for Games with Two-Level Communication Structures

van den Brink, Rene; Khmelnitskaya, Anna; van der Laan, … - 2011

We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures, being structures where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326497

Independence Axioms for Water Allocation

van den Brink, Rene; Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; van … - 2011

We consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river. Each agent has quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, where the benefit of consuming an amount of water is given by a continuous and concave benefit function. A solution to the problem efficiently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326510

The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree

van den Brink, Rene; Herings, Jean-Jacques; van der … - 2012

allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of … the power set of the set of players. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that follow from a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326524

Axiomatizations of Two Types of Shapley Values for Games on Union Closed Systems

van den Brink, Rene; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2009

of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that … are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. We consider and axiomatize two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325733

An Efficient and Fair Solution for Communication Graph Games

van den Brink, Rene; Khmelnitskaya, Anna; van der Laan, … - 2011

We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the communication graph the total payoff to the players of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325828

Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games

van den Brink, Rene - 2009

Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325938