It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping ö from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image ö (x)has a nonempty intersection with the normal...

AMS classification: 90B18; 91A12; 91A43;

Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this...

We consider an exchange economy in which price rigidities are present. In the short run the non-numeraire commodities have a exible price level with respect to the numeraire commodity but their relative prices are mutually fixed. In the long run prices are assumed to be completely exible. For a...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities {or simply a TU-game. A value function for TU-games is a function that assigns to every game a distribution of the payoffs. A value function...