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coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691
distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325689
distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … computing the nucleolus of every restricted game corresponding to some disjunctive non-negative additive game with an acyclic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325798
ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in … the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove … that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324576
individual compensations, and one about case-system consistency. This unique compensation scheme is the nucleolus of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526119
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973
In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-game is obtained by taking the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326357
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324857
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325424