Similar Search Results

Lectures on Political Competition and Welfare

Besley, Timothy - London School of Economics and Political Science - 1999

There are N citizens who have to make a social decision about a set policies denotedby x ∈ A, where A denotes the set of feasible policies. Citizen’s preferencesover policy are denoted V i (x, j) ( where i = 1, ...,N) ,and j denotes the identityof the policy maker. This specification allows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248811

Trade and competitiveness with other regions

High Level Group on the Competitiveness of the European … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009635860

Energy, feedstock, infrastructure and logistics

High Level Group on the Competitiveness of the European … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009635861

From Sickness to Death: The Financial Viability of the English Friendly Societies And Coming of the Old Age Pensions Act, 1875-1908

Broten, Nicholas - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2010

Traditional theories of the origins of the welfare state have emphasized the financial weakness of Britain’s largest provider of mutual insurance in the late 19th century, the friendly societies. These theories share common implications with contemporary theories of institutional change...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870390

Social Insurance Regimes: crises and ‘reform’ in the Argentine and Brazil,since c. 1900

Lewis, Colin M.; Lloyd-Sherlock, Peter - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2002

The paper examines the structural and organisational problems of social insurancesystems in Brazil and the Argentine in order to illuminate current debates about pension‘reform’. Much of the present discussion depicts social insurance ‘crisis’ as a modernphenomenon. Similarly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870696

Evolutionary Portfolio Selection with Liquidity Shocks

De Giorgi, Enrico - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2004

The wealth dynamics of insurance companies strongly depends on the success of their investment strategies, but also on liquidity shocks which occur during unfavorable years, when indemnities to be paid to the clients exceed collected premia. An investment strategy that does not take liquidity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858142

COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND WELFARE

Mukherjee, Arijit - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We show the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on R&D investmentand social welfare in a duopoly with R …&D competition where success in R&D isprobabilistic. We show that R&D investments are higher under Bertrand (Cournot)competition when … Cournot competition can generate highersocial welfare in absence of knowledge spillover and this happens if R&D is drastic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868763

ENTRY IN A STACKELBERG PERFECTEQUILIBRIUM

Mukherjee, Arijit - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firmbehaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work(Klemperer, 1988, Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may alwaysincrease welfare. Using general demand function, we show the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868767

ENTRY, LICENSING AND WELFARE

Mukherjee, Arijit; Mukherjee, Soma - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We show the welfare effects of entry in presence of technology licensingunder Cournot competition. If the entrant is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868772

Entry in a vertically separated industry:price vs. quantity competition

Mukherjee, Arijit; Broll, Udo; Mukherjee, Soma - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2004

This paper considers the effects of entry in the final goods market when the input market is imperfectly competitive. We show that entry of a new firm may increase profit of the incumbent if the technology of the entrant is sufficiently inferior to that of the incumbent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868787