The paper discusses the role of various constituencies in the corporate governance of a corporation from the perspective of incomplete contracts. A strict shareholder value orientation in the sense of a rule that at any time firm decisions should be made strictly in the interest of the present...

This paper investigates four common features (covenants) of venture capital investment contracts from a real option perspective, using both analytical solutions and numerical analysis to draw inferences for a better understanding of contract features.

Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) proposed a system of self-financed transfers to expand the number of countries that sign an international environmental agreement. They also suggested a mechanism that detects cheating in those agreements when the emissions of an individual country cannot be...

Zentraler Untersuchungsgegenstand der modernen Finanzierungstheorie ist die Struktur von Finanzierungsverträgen. Entsprechende theoretische Analysen beziehen sich jedoch üblicherweise ausschließlich auf sowohl rechtlich als auch wirtschaftlich selbständige Unternehmen,während der in der...

We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets, studyinga credit market where the qualities of investment projects are notobservable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible...

Service-oriented computing as a concept for providing interoperability and flexibility within heterogeneous environments has gained much attention within the last few years. Dynamically integrating external Web services into enterprise applications requires automatic contracting between service...

We study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual contribution to form value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous...

A popular view of limited liability in financial contracting is that it is the result of societal preferences against escessive penalties. The view of most financial economists is instead that limited liability emerged as an optimal institution when, in the absence of a clear limit on economic...

This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can beassigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...