Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium providesgood predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however,actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attributethe robust deviations...

This lecture is a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideasare fleshed out in a book Natural Justice, which is itself a condensed versionof an earlier two-volume book Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore[14, 12, 13])...

Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibriumplay, i.e., a specific convention tells all players in a game withmultiple strict equilibria which equilibrium to play. In our view, coordinationoften takes place before learning about the games. Thus, one hasto coordinate...

In der Literatur zur Abschlußprüfung ist ein negativer Effekt eines ökonomischen Vorteils aus der wiederholten Mandatsannahme, der aufgrund von Transaktionskosten entsteht, auf die Unabhängigkeit des Abschlußprüfers diskutiert worden. Anders als die bisher vorgestellten Ansätze wird im...

The successful deregulation of other network industries like telecommunications and electricity has put increasing pressure on governments to deregulate and liberalize letter markets.(...)

Die vorliegende Arbeit besteht aus drei eigenständigen Teilen, die sich in ihrer Form jeweils an wissenschaftlichen Aufsätzen orientieren. Es wird jeweils ein Modell zu den wichtigsten Verhandlungsformen {bilateral, monopolistisch und polylateral) vorgestellt, analysiert und diskutiert.(...)

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects' expectations about each other's behavior are also elicited. (...)

We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments in which followers either perfectly observe the leaders' actions or else observe nothing. (...)

This paper analytically investigates the credibility of managerial forecast disclosure introducing a game theoretic perspective by extracting robust implications from disclosure models.