Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unboundedsupport, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibriumoutcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of afinancial market as the support of private information converges to an...

Basierend auf einem strukturellen Modell analysieren die Autoren das Bedeutung informierten Handels (adverse Selektionseffekte) und dessen Auswirkung auf die Liquiditätsqualität in Xetra, dem elektronischen Handelssystem der Deutschen Börse . Die ökonometrische Analyse basiert auf einem...

Die London Stock Exchange hat im Jahr 1997 dem Publikum die Möglichkeit eingeräumt, durch die Abgabe von limitierten Ordern bei bestimmten Aktien direkt mit den Händlern zu konkurrieren. Anders als bei der NASDAQ, wurde in London für diese Aktien auch die Verpflichtung für die Händler...

We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets, studyinga credit market where the qualities of investment projects are notobservable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible...

With adverse selection, diseconomies of scale associated with hierarchies may induce the implementation of a second-best technology. This occurs whenever rents to lower tiers of the hierarchy increase faster than total surplus. This is more likely with longer hierarchies.

We examine how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish goodborrowers from bad ones, because borrowers may exogenously...

Deposit insurances schemes are increasingly being adopted around the world and yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. In this paper we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance based around the idea that bankers have vuluable but costly...