This paper investigates the optimal bidding strategy for the initial bidder in takeover contests. In the theoretical model, the initial bidder has the choice between making a low or a high preemtive initial bid.(...)

The bidder who wins at an auction may end up paying more for an asset than it is actually worth. This, stated very simply, is the so-called winner's curse. Consider the simplest possible case where the asset has the same actual value to all bidders, but bidders do not know for certain what that...

Auction fever is a multifaceted phenomenon thatis frequently observed in both traditional and Internetauctions. In order to gain a better understanding of itscauses, we develop a conceptual framework to analyzeemotions in auctions, which is based on an exhaustiveliterature review. The framework...

Auctions are nowadays a popular and frequently employed market mechanism in electronicmarkets. In economic literature, the success of electronic auctions has been largelyattributed to the reduction of transaction costs, the large number of potential buyers,and the independence of time and space....

Though auctions show a prevailing dominance in electronic markets, our understanding of howauctions work on human behaviour is still rather limited. In this paper we analyse the impact ofemotional processes on the decision making of human agents in electronic auctions. The analysis isbased on a...

Two auction mechanisms are studied in which players compete with one another for an exogenously determined prize by independently submitting integer bids in some discrete and commonly known strategy space specified by the auctioneer. In the unique lowest (highest) bid auction game, the winner of...

The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersedinformation. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider,however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simplecall auction game where both auction prices and limit...

As firms implement tournament bonus reward schemes, mainly the idea is to introduce competition amongst their agents in the order to promote their performance.Tournaments in which agents compete for a bonus by investing effort, are frequentlyapplied, e.g., in development races, political...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...