Die Kassenärztlichen Vereinigungen streben mit ihren Reformen insbesondere eine Stabilisierung des Punktwertes an. Die Interessen der Patienten werden bei den Reformüberlegungen bisher weitgehend vernachlässigt. Dies bedingt die Unterrepräsentation der sprechenden Medizin, die geringe...

"Informal" know-how trading is the extensive exchange of proprietaryknow-how by informal networks of process engineers in rival (and non-rival)firms ...

Vorliegendes Arbeitspapier analysiert sowohl entscheidungs- wie auch spieltheoretisch die Entscheidungssituation der Aktionäre, die einem Übernahmeangebot gegenüber stehen. Als erstes wird dabei der Begriff des "Gefangenendilemmas" definiert. Ferner wird dann die Entscheidungssituation für...

Reputation bildet eine wichtige Vorraussetzung für das Funktionierende des alltäglichen Wirtschaftslebens.

In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion inthe standard prisoner’s dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychologicalbehaviors. This concept enables to take account each player’s assessmentof the other player’s behavior and the asymmetry of information....

Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners’ dilemma gamewith an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners’ dilemmagames in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperationin all but the last round. Our four main...

Using a symmetric 2-person prisoners’ dilemma as the base game, each playerreceives a signal for the number of rounds to be played with the same partner.The actual number of rounds (the length of the supergame) is determined bythe maximal signal where each player expects the other’s signal...

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators in an anonymous decision environment by allowing participants to condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma and a trust game (i) on their partner's donation share to a self-selected charity, and...

This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averseindividuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain thanwhen it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline inwhich the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; CertainPunishment in which the prisoner’s...