We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilitiesdepend on the history of the play, i.e., the players’past action choices.To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward crite-rion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewardswhich can be...

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of a …-nancial market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assetspay dividends that are partially consumed and partially rein-vested. The traders use general, adaptive strategies (portfoliorules), distributing their wealth between...

The paper examines a game-theoretic model of a …nancial market inwhich asset prices are determined endogenously in terms of short-runequilibrium. Investors use general, adaptive strategies depending onthe exogenous states of the world and the observed history of thegame. The main goal is to...

This article tests the modell of Brander and lewis under ertrand and Cournot competition.

We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments in which followers either perfectly observe the leaders' actions or else observe nothing. (...)

It is known that the Cournot model of quantity competition has to be inter-preted as the reduced form of a more complex situation, in which firms can commit tocapacity levels prior to setting prices. I show that the optimal strategic debt choice ofcapacity-price competitors depend on the type of...

We consider how the introduction of financial innovations may affect the intensity of productmarket competition. When rival firms issue debt, their product market behavior is driven by strategic con-siderations that are different from the ones in the case of pure equity financing. In particular,...