A vast literature shows that individuals frequently fail to identify the normative solutionsin logical reasoning tasks. Much attention has been devoted to the study ofthese deviations at the individual level; less effort was exerted to investigate whetherinstitutional settings might facilitate...

Though auctions show a prevailing dominance in electronic markets, our understanding of howauctions work on human behaviour is still rather limited. In this paper we analyse the impact ofemotional processes on the decision making of human agents in electronic auctions. The analysis isbased on a...

Two auction mechanisms are studied in which players compete with one another for an exogenously determined prize by independently submitting integer bids in some discrete and commonly known strategy space specified by the auctioneer. In the unique lowest (highest) bid auction game, the winner of...

The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersedinformation. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider,however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simplecall auction game where both auction prices and limit...

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...

A vast literature shows that individuals frequently violate normative principles in reasoning. In evaluatingthe relevance of these findings for psychology, economics, and related disciplines, it is natural to askwhether reasoning errors reflect random aberrations or systematic biases. One...