In this paper we consider conventions as regularities in behavior which help to solve coordinationproblems in a society. These problems can be formalized as non-cooperative games with severalequilibria. We know that in such situations serious problems of equilibrium selection arise whichcannot...

Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilized to analyze games by their "game-like"...

This paper focuses on the uneasy alliance of rational choice and evolutionary explanations in modern economics. While direct evolutionary explanations of "optimality" rule out "purposeful" rational choice by assuming zero-intelligence and pure rational choice explanations leave no room for...

There is robust field data showing that a frequent and successful way of looking fora job is via the intermediation of friends and relatives. Here we want to explore thisexperimentally. Participants first play a simple public good game with two interactionpartners friends, and share whatever...

Facing a stochastic market wage, which is independent of their own hiring policy, employersoffer contracts specifying fixed wage, revenue share and employment duration.In ongoing employment relations it depends on the treatment whether fixed wages canbe only increased or also decreased. Will the...

Two firms compete on a sales market as well as in hiring labor. The duopolists'sales levels depend on their workforce. There are two each of two typesof workers, mobile and immobile, with differing effort costs. An immobileworker's eort costs are lower when he is employed by the local firm,...

Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) haveshown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations.This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharingmonetary rewards. But even when...

Each of several exchange partners is the monopoly owner of a specific commoditywhich she can share with others. It is optimal to keep the own endowment, but allwould gain by mutual gift exchange. Participants play the game repeatedly in constantgroups (partner design) and can establish stable...

On an otherwise symmetric oligopoly market with stochastic demands for heterogeneousproducts firms can either hire an employee or partner or buy therequired labor input on the labor market. Whereas the wage of hired labor doesnot depend on the realization of stochastic demand, the price of...

This paper shows, that after observing the investment decisions by firm owners their employees can engage in costly training, thus increasing their general and firm-specific productivity, which also depends on capital endowment...