This paper estimates the issuers' demand for the banker's underwriting service across different varieties of equity-linked securities.

This paper shows how this becomes an informational first-mover advantage that turns innovators into the market leader.

We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework whereparties are risk-neutral and the agent is ¯nancially constrained. Weshow that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining poweris analyzed in either of the following three frameworks; a standard P-Aframework by varying...

Die vorliegende Arbeit besteht aus drei eigenständigen Teilen, die sich in ihrer Form jeweils an wissenschaftlichen Aufsätzen orientieren. Es wird jeweils ein Modell zu den wichtigsten Verhandlungsformen {bilateral, monopolistisch und polylateral) vorgestellt, analysiert und diskutiert.(...)

We use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipelinenetwork determines the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. If theassessment is narrowly focussed on the abilities to obstruct °ows in the existingsystem, the main transit countries Belarus and Ukraine...

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...

We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decisionof the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude oneof two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responderacceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one ofthem, what increases the...

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individualsto voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, weuse an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in whichresponders can only accept or reject the o®er, and the other in which theycan also...

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifiesthe winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume thatcontestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizationsto the case where each...

The study of gender differences in social preferences has shown mixedresults, preventing economists and other social scientists from drawingdefinitive conclusions on this topic. Several original investigations andexperimental reviews have hypothesized that the main reason of this heterogeneityof...