We analyze non-cooperative environmental policy when the only strategic interac-tion between countries is through bilateral transboundary pollution, i.e., countries areclosed or small open economies. When countries set pollution taxes simultaneously,there is no carbon leakage. However, in the...

We analyze the effects of free trade on environmental policies in a strategic setting withtransboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmentaloutcomes, making both countries worse off. With command and control policies(quotas), there is no race to the...

Wirtschaftsethik befasst sich mit der Frage, wie moralische Normen und Ideale unter den modernen Bedingungen einer internationalen, wettbewerblich verfassten Marktwirtschaft zur Geltung gebracht werden können. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die in der Wirtschaftsethik primär behandelten Probleme wie...

To analyze strategic interaction which may induce externalities, we designed Bathroom Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs. Two people regularly use a bathroom, before leaving they can either clean up the mess made, or not. Cleaning up involves an effort, so this option always gives a...

We provide a stress experimental test of the ability of (a damaged based version) the ambient tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a non-point pollution context. To mirror the features of naturally occurring environments, we consider a convex damage function, uncertainty in...

We study the optimal R&D trajectory in a setting where new technologiesare never perfect backstops in the sense that there is no perfectlyclean technology that eventually solves the pollution problem once andfor all. New technologies have stings attached, i.e. each emits a specificstock...