The extinction of genetic resources as a consequence of land development, especially in ‘biodiversity hot spots’like rain forests in South America or South East Asia, is becoming a serious problem - not only for local communitiesbut also for international firms in the pharmaceutical...

We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of the shadow economy onentrepreneurial entry, utilising 1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitordata merged with macro level variables. A simple correlation coefficient suggests a positivelinear link between the size of the...

We explore the country-specific institutional characteristics likely to influence an individual’sdecision to become an entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedomfrom corruption, and on ‘market freedom’ defined as a cluster of variables related toprotection of property...

In this paper we explore the relationship between the individual decision to become anentrepreneur and the institutional context. We pinpoint the critical roles of property rights andthe size of the state sector for entrepreneurial activity and test the relationships empirically bycombining...

In this paper we combine a wide range of country-level institutional indicators with surveydata taken from the Global Enterprise Monitor on potential and actual entrepreneurial entry,to investigate the role of the institutions as determinants of the entrepreneurial entry,controlling for...

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologiesto catch …sh. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery;the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’resource game may induceseveral ‘subjective’...

We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilitiesdepend on the history of the play, i.e., the players’past action choices.To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward crite-rion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewardswhich can be...

We discuss political economy mechanisms which can explain the resource curse,in which an increase in the size of resource rents causes a decrease in the economy’stotal value added. We identify a number of channels through which resource rentswill alter the incentives of a political leader....