This paper provides a stylized choice-thoretic model to analyze optimal monetary policies among interdependent economies. In response to marcoeconomic shocks, policymakers strike a balance between two objectives. The first is to stabilize marginal costs and markups to offset the distortions...

This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities,monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic approximation to the utility ofthe consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers.It is shown...

We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfareand two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly differentcountry-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities inseven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous...

Global liquidity expansion has been very dynamic since 2001. Contrary to conventionalwisdom, high money growth rates have not coincided with a concurrent rise in goodsprices. At the same time, however, asset prices have increased sharply, significantlyoutpacing the subdued development in...

Dieser Beitrag erweitert die Standardmodellierung der Literatur über Informationsaustausch zwischen Unternehmen bei Nachfrageunsicherheit und läßt sich vor allem auf Unternehmen in neuen Branchen oder in unsicheren Märkten anwenden ...

A unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned bygroup of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating theothers monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel,Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically and...

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologiesto catch …sh. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery;the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’resource game may induceseveral ‘subjective’...