In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....

In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion inthe standard prisoner’s dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychologicalbehaviors. This concept enables to take account each player’s assessmentof the other player’s behavior and the asymmetry of information....

Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workersagainst a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences andhelps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments findsick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. Butsick-pay is not without its...

A firm with stochastic demand can rely on hired hands when demand is low and rent additionallabour when demand is higher. For high demand this implies the co-employmentof hired hands, paid directly by the firm, and of rented hands who are paid by a rentalagency. This may cause severe problems if...

This paper shows that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performanceof an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well.

In generosity games, one agreement payo is exogenously given,whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the"pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiencyor equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity...

Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is the computational study of economic processesmodeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. This essay discusses the potentialuse of ACE modeling tools for the study of macroeconomic systems. Points are illustratedusing an ACE model of a two-sector...

Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may,first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose workeffort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for bothtasks as offered by...

Several division rules have been proposed in the literature regarding how anarbiter should divide a bankrupt estate. Different rules satisfy different sets ofaxioms, but all rules satisfy claims boundedness which requires that no contributorbe given more than her initial contribution. This paper...

Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback onthe losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback isnot given. Furthermore, bids tend to be above the equilibrium predictions for riskneutral bidders. While the latter...