This paper reviews the Hotelling literature of product differentiation. The purpose of this work is to examine the impact of the market structure on price competitionand equilibrium differentiation. The existence of a general ’principle of differentiation’ is rejected. In contrast,...

This paper deals with the introduction of stock options in an (dy-namically) incomplete securities market.

This paper extends the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the multi-firm case. Considering locational equilibria we show that neither holds the Principle of Maximum Differentiation - as in the duopoly model - nor does the Principle of Minimum Differentiation - as in the...

The …xed rate tender is one of the main operational formats usedby central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. Whileacademic research has largely dismissed the procedure for its tendency to en-courage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of Englandhave...

Many social networks have the following properties: (i) a short average distancebetween any two individuals; (ii) a high clustering coe±cient; (iii) segregation pat-terns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) de¯ne a small worldnetwork. This paper develops a strategic...

This paper analyses how competition over rebates for customer loyalty across product lines affects firms` pricing and consumers generally. If buyers incur firm specific costs or have shop specific tastes then competitive loyalty discounts lower consumer surplus overall and raise profits - the...

One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits withoutenforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking andrather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it.[...]