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Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time¤- An Experimental Study

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867324

An Application of the English Clock MarketMechanism to Public Goods Games

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Neugebauer, Tibor - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2001

We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are notsubmitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individualspress a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. This publicgoods institution exploits the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867325

Initial Offerings of Options

Müller, Sigrid - Humboldt-Universität <Berlin> / Institut für Finanzierung - 2001

This paper deals with the introduction of stock options in an (dy-namically) incomplete securities market.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005841030

Why Government Bonds Are Sold by Auction and Corporate Bonds by Posted-Price Selling

Habib, Michel A.; Ziegler, Alexandre - 2003

This paper establishes the result that the seller prefers posted-price selling when the cost of information acquisition is high, and auctions when it is low. We view corporate bonds as an instance of the former case, and government bonds as an instance of the latter.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005843439

Overbidding in Fixed-Rate Tenders: The Role of Exposure Risk

Ewerhart, Christian; Cassola, Nuno; Valla, Natacha - National Centre of Competence in Research - Financial … - 2011

-ering an auction-theoretic setting with privately known declining marginalvaluations. Since overbidding entails exposure risk … monetary policies. Whileacademic research has largely dismissed the procedure for its tendency to en-courage overbidding … inefficient. Empirical proxies of exposure risk are signicant in both Euro andSterling operations. Our ndings have implications …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009522185

Bidding in common value fair division games: The winner’scurse or even worse?

Becker, Alice; Brünner, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

corresponding common value auction.Whereas symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria are rather similar for both games,behavior differs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870973

Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits- An Axiomatic Approach -

Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits withoutenforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking andrather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it.[...]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022159

Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in DecentralizedSimultaneous Ascending Auctions

Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng - Iowa State University of Science and Technology <Ames, … - 2008

A model of English auction that allows jump bidding is proposed. When twoobjects are sold separately via such English auctions, I construct an equilibrium suchthat bidders signal via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the priceswithout relying on any central mediator. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360839

Fixed-Prinz Tournaments versus First-Price Auctions in Innovation Contests

Schöttner, Anja - 2006

This paper analyzes a procurement setting with identical ﬁrms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a ﬁxed-prize tournament to a ﬁrst-price auction. The reason is that holding an auction may leave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005857923

Procurement Mechanisms when Signals about Quality are Observable

Schöttner, Anja - 2005

I compare an auction and a tournament in a procurement setting where a noncontractible signal about the quality that each firm is able to supply is observed by the procurer and all competing firms. Signals are affected by firms noncontractibleinvestments in R&D and the procurers precision of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005857931

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