Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits withoutenforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking andrather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it.[...]

Dieser Beitrag skizziert das ordonomische Forschungsprogramm einer ökonomischen Theorie der Moral und stellt die Grundzüge einer mit dieser Methode arbeitenden Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik vor: Die Ordonomik versteht sich als eine rationalchoice-basierte Analyse der Interdependenz von...

Based on economic ethics, this paper reflects on and aims to improve the semantics of responsibility. The traditional concept of responsibility is threatened with erosion when responsibility is attributed to an actor who is unable to exercise individual control over the outcome of his actions....

Dieser Aufsatz formuliert einen anreizethischen Beitrag zur Aufklärung der Verantwortungssemantik: Das traditionelle Verantwortungskonzept droht zu erodieren, wo Verantwortung einem Akteur zugeschrieben wird, der über die Folgen seines Handelns keine Ergebniskontrolle ausüben kann. In der...

We ask how normative statements are possible within an economic theory framework that recognises the importance of institutional arrangements. Instead of applying established outcome-oriented criteria of social welfare, we examine whether the rules of economic interaction allow the acquisition...

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identicalindividual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric andconcave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles...

We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...

We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one of two asset markets. Due to endogenous participation the markets may differ in the liquidity they provide. Moreover, traders have idiosyncratic preferences for the markets, e.g. due to differential time preferences for...

In a market with stochastic demand at most one seller can acquire costly informationabout demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the marketdemand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in the market. Theseidiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential...

Social institutions regulating group conduct have been regarded as necessaryfor human cooperation to transcend family bonds. However, manystudies in economics and biology indicate that reciprocity based on repeatedinteraction suffices to establish cooperation with non-kin. We shedlight on the...