In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then take part in a 3-person game. In the game one player chooses between two possibilities. The first is an outside option which assigns a positive amount to that player, but leaves the two others empty-handed. The second...

Updating behavior in cascade experiments is usually investigated onthe basis of urn prediction. But urn predictions alone can only providea very rough information on individual updating behavior. Therefore, weimplement a Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (BDM) mechanism. Subjects haveto submit maximum...

In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al.,1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants'probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in...

In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting. We present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate...

In a cascade experiment subjects are confronted with artificial predecessors prdecting in line with the BHW model (Bikhchandandi, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Using the BDM mechanism we study subjects' probability assignments based on price limits for participating in the prediction game. We...

We examine the explanatory power of cascade models by implementing the BDM-mechanism in a simple cascade experiment in which subject have to decide on the prediction of a randomly choasen urn. Assigned price limits to participate in the prediction game are used as indicators of subjective...

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...