Showing 1 - 10 of 17
A model is analyzed in which agents exert effort to create innovations within an organization. When payments are infeasible, the decision on the implementation of a proposal is shown to bemadeby simplemonotonic decision rules. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845884
Die Governance der Zentralbanken hat zwei Dimensionen: Corporate Governance und Public Governance. Public Governance ist ein institutioneller Rahmen, wobei die breite Öffentlichkeit eine Zentralbank regelt durch und durch die Legislative und Exekutive in einem Land. Dieses Papier argumentiert,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870975
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173
In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022175
We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248883
Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since theycare more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that allevaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order.The rules must specify for all possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248888
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants vetopower to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of biddingprocesses to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a“productive state”. At heart...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248891
Recent developments in voting theory show that Condorcet profiles embedded in electoratesare responsible for conflicts between pairwise voting methods and for reversals ofrankings under positional methods whenever candidates are dropped or added. Because ofthe strong symmetry of the rankings of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360703
Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is mod-elled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted tof0; 1g: The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces ahierarchy in the set of players in terms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360752
This paper investigates the role that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays in shaping social preferences over the degree of labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand where the productivity of firms evolves over time as a Geometric Brownian motion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005859642