In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochasticlength two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talkstated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secretintention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted...

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...

We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...

A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferencesis that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preferencetypes are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this resultis due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynam-ics some Bayesian...

We study the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games, featuring two or three players choosing among two or three strategies. We examine how subjects’ reported reasoning translates into their choices and beliefs about others’ choices, and how...

This paper deals with the introduction of stock options in an (dy-namically) incomplete securities market.

This paper examines ¯nite parimutuel betting games with asymmetric information, with par-ticular attention to di®erences between sequential and simultaneous settings, and betweenfully rational and myopic (\price taking") behavior. In the simultaneous parimutuel market,all (symmetric and...

Dieser Beitrag erweitert die Standardmodellierung der Literatur über Informationsaustausch zwischen Unternehmen bei Nachfrageunsicherheit und läßt sich vor allem auf Unternehmen in neuen Branchen oder in unsicheren Märkten anwenden ...